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Abstract 
Resilience is on the rise in security policies, at the international as well as at the national level. 
Current academic research often links resilience with either the neoliberal retreat of the state and 
the respective attempt of ‘governing from a distance’, or with an almost totalitarian grasp of 
‘resilient subjects’, or both. Against the background of the application of resilience in UK security 
policy, this article argues that resilience does neither of these. Instead, it unfolds as a rather 
mundane endeavour focused on micro-practices of civil emergency response at the local level. In 
doing so, resilience enables the repackaging of ‘unbound security’, which was doomed to fail in 
delivering its promise. It is, however, neither offering another promise nor symbolising a retreat from 
state responsibility, but engages in a defensive micro-management of potential catastrophe. 
Resilience hence does not replace security as a practice of the state deriving from its sovereignty, but 
links up with it to create a nexus between the doable and the undoable, the resilience-security-
nexus. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Resilienz hat sich in den letzten Jahren zu einem Schlüsselbegriff in nationalen und internationalen 
Sicherheitskonzepten entwickelt. Der derzeitige Stand der Forschung verbindet das Konzept vielfach 
mit einer neoliberalen Politik des staatlichen Rückzugs aus seiner sicherheitspolitischen 
Verantwortung, oder mit einem nahezu totalitären Zugriff auf „resiliente Subjekte“. Anhand einer 
empirischen Untersuchung der britischen Resilienz-Politik zeigt dieser Artikel, dass keiner dieser 
Ansätze zutrifft. Vielmehr entpuppt sich Resilienz als ein profaner Ansatz des Katastrophenschutzes 
auf lokaler Ebene. Allerdings ermöglicht Resilienz damit erst wieder die Sicherheitsverantwortlichkeit 
des Staates, der an seinem Versprechen der „umfassenden Sicherheit“ gescheitert ist. Damit ist 
Resilienz nicht als Rückzug souveräner Sicherheitspolitik zu verstehen, sondern als staatliches Micro-
Management der potenziellen Katastrophen. Resilienz löst daher die Idee einer souveränen 
Sicherheit auch nicht ab, sondern verbindet das sicherheitspolitisch Mögliche und Unmögliche in 
einem Resilienz-Sicherheits-Nexus. 
 
Keywords 
Resilience-Security-Nexus, UK Resilience Policy, Sovereign Security, Resilient Subjects 
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Introduction 
 
It is of no doubt that resilience has made its way into the mainstream of security policy and research 
(Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann & Kristensen, 2015, pp. 3-4). While in international security the term is 
strongly associated with the consequences of climate change and resource scarcity (e.g. Newman, 
Beatley & Boyer, 2009; Gaillard, 2010), in nationally framed security efforts resilience was introduced 
primarily in disaster control and crisis management (e.g. Manyena, 2006). Such resilience-based 
disaster response was substantially influenced by the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015’ 
(UNISDR, 2005), and later disseminated to areas such as the protection of critical infrastructure (De 
Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007) or terrorism (e.g. Coaffee & Wood, 2006). States such as the USA, UK, 
Israel, Australia or Singapore, meanwhile, organise their security-related policy framework around 
the concept of resilience. 
 
Yet, the relationship between security and resilience remains remarkably unclear. Resilience has 
developed with significant conceptual vagueness, which at times reduces the concept to a virtually 
empty signifier. This is particularly noticeable in the context of security, since such vagueness offers 
opportunities for policy actors to then transport various particular interests in this broad vehicle (cf. 
Zebrowski, 2016, p. 5). Hence, resilience still represents a considerable political, practical, but also 
analytical, challenge.  
 
This article aims to contribute to the necessary clarification, particularly at the analytical level. It will 
ask if resilience, as it unfolds conceptually and empirically, indeed represents a paradigm shift in 
security policy, and if so, how this shift can be understood. Resilience governance in the realm of 
nation-state based security policy necessarily has to face the paradox of inducing a societal process in 
a top-down, or ‘macro-structural’ manner (Wilson, 2014). How this problem is addressed, and also 
reasoned, by security policy actors is one of the main questions of the transformative effect 
resilience might – or might not – have on security policies, particularly at the level of sovereign 
nation states. A second issue is the relationship between resilience and security on the conceptual 
level. Here, resilience has played an inherent part in the transition from defence to comprehensive 
security, when the end of the Cold War terminated purely defence-based concepts and opened up 
the area of ‘security unbound’ (cf. Huysmans, 2014, pp. 5-8). In this respect, the article argues that 
while resilience represents, to a certain extent, an answer to the necessary failure of security to 
deliver its promises as given by the sovereign state, it needs, at the same time, a sovereignty-based 
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notion of security to come into being. In this sense, ‘it operates as a critical and reflexive element 
rather than as a radical alternative understanding’ (Joseph, 2016, p. 380). The intrinsic, but still 
contradictory relationship between security and resilience then forms what we will call the 
resilience-security-nexus. 
 
Against the background of the UK resilience policy, which is undoubtedly the frontrunner in the 
application of the concept in Europe, we will ask how resilience made its way into the realm of 
security policy documents, and what new practices, agents and subjects it has engendered during 
that journey. In the first section, we will discuss the current state of research on resilience in the 
wider context of security policy. Subsequently, the paper will scrutinize UK resilience policy on two 
levels: firstly, the entry of resilience into the national strategic level; secondly, the detailed, but still 
state-led local policies and guidelines are touched upon, focussing on the actual governance that 
unfolds along the resilience-security-nexus. The conclusions aim to identify patterns that could make 
sense beyond the UK context and sketch further implications for a comparative analysis of the 
resilience-security-nexus. 
 
The Debate on Resilience in Security Studies 
 
While resilience can be seen as a slightly modified reincarnation of traditional civil defence measures 
(cf. Duffield, 2011; Zebrowski, 2013, p. 2), many analytical accounts agree that the concept has 
formed in a conceptually different manner. This is mainly interpreted as being related to a 
fundamentally changed perception in the security policy community, which shifts the focus from 
clearly identifiable threats to undefinable risks in the sense of ‘unknown unknowns’ (Chandler, 
2014b, p. 62). In the course of this process, the conceptualisation of ‘complex emergencies’ develops 
from the field of humanitarian relief and development in conflict zones (Keen, 2008) to an 
application increasingly used in home affairs (Cabinet Office, 2013c, p. 22-23; Brassett & Williams, 
2015, p. 37; cf. Alexander, 2013, p. 1-2), which, in turn, results in the ‘widespread acknowledgement 
that Civil Defence was poorly suited to tackle’ these crises (Zebrowski, 2013, p. 14). 
 
As a consequence, security, very much tied to the idea of defence during the Cold War, became a 
considerably enlarged project, ‘to a diffusing governmental practice reaching into areas such as 
migration, environmental protection, natural and human-made disaster relief, humanitarian actions 
and development policy’ (Huysmans 2014, p. 76). This diffusion initially was widely welcomed, 
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particularly by critical security scholars, known as ‘wideners’ (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 1-
7). However, this shift entailed a new threat scenario, constituted through uncertainty and risk 
(Huysmans, 2014, p. 77-78). Therefore, risk governance became the new mantra in security policies, 
something Corry (2012) has framed as ‘riskification’. Along this argument, the process of riskification 
is intrinsically linked to the idea of resilience, as security cannot be guaranteed in the context of 
permanent risk.  
 
While it is a generally undisputed claim that resilience is related to the concept of risk, the relation of 
resilience and security is interpreted in diverse ways. Within critical security studies and the recent 
‘critical turn’ in resilience research (cf. Biermann et al, 2016), three strands of thinking can be 
distinguished: one perceives resilience as the replacement of security, a second one views resilience 
as a reconfiguration, and a third perspective perceives resilience as a kind of enhanced security. 
 
By imposing the ontological assumption that resilience renders a catastrophic imaginary of the world 
in which everyone is in constant danger, Evans and Reid (2013, p. 83) are perhaps the most 
outspoken representatives of those claiming that resilience tends to replace security (cf. Evans & 
Reid, 2014, p. 2). Following this logic, resilience establishes the exceptional as the new normal and, in 
doing so, effectively disables any potential that could be rendered as political. Since being concerned 
with the anyway forsaken survival of humanity, resilience thus is a play for time, and not an attempt 
of transformation (Evans & Reid, 2014, p. 151). 
 
This radical ontological claim by Evans and Reid is contrasted by a more nuanced, but nevertheless 
lively debate about the resilience-induced reconfiguration of security. Security for these accounts, 
however, still remains to deal with the exceptional. Therefore, Corry (2014, p. 267-269) assumes that 
it would not be replaced by resilience; rather, resilience would replace the idea of defence. 
Notwithstanding the general agreement that a realm of security exists, the principal dispute whether 
resilience represents an epistemological shift in security thinking, or creates a whole new ontology, 
drives the debate. One of the main issues in this context is that resilience changes the emphasis from 
problems to responses, which Aradau (2014, pp. 74-76) perceives as an epistemic shift. 
 
Chandler (2014b, pp. 47-48) instead claims that this particular shift to problems constitutes an 
ontological turn, as it deals no longer with the knowable, because the emergences of complex 
systems by definition cannot be known. The framing of resilience in complexity thinking becomes 
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increasingly popular in critical security studies, which on the one hand is caused by theory (cf. 
Comfort et al, 2002; Walker & Cooper, 2011), but also by what is claimed to be changing ontological 
conditions of security policy: ‘Security is now the mediation of failure’ and ‘[…] the resilience 
discourse advocates the acceptance of insecurity as a fundamental condition’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015, p. 
72; cf. Kaufmann, 2013: p. 67). 
 
Complexity thinking, particularly in its application in UK resilience policy, would, according to 
Chandler (2014b, p. 58), change the perception of the government, as unknowability becomes 
constitutional for governance practices. Aradau (2014, p. 87) also considers this as one of the central 
problems of resilience, because resilience ‘[…] remains hostage to the limits knowledge’. Therefore, 
resilience policies would remove ‘the modernist understanding of government as instrumentally 
acting in a world potentially amendable to cause-and-effect understandings of policy-making’ 
(Chandler, 2014b, p. 58). In so doing, it alters also the subject positions of the governed, in a way 
Chandler (ibid.) describes as a narrowing of the gap between government and the governed, and 
‘fundamentally challenges the traditional liberal assumptions on which the division of the public and 
the private spheres was constructed’ (Chandler, 2013, p. 214). Such a process has severe 
consequences on sovereignty, which needs a liberal framework in place, particularly in the form of a 
distant responsibility of the state for the governed. 
 
Resilience policies instead blur the clear, liberal boundaries and tend to work through practices of 
denial (Joseph, 2016, p. 381). Resilience emphasizes the need for adaptability to future insecurities, 
inscribing the responsibility of the struggle to ‘(re-)establish’ security to subjects (cf. Dunn Cavelty, 
Kaufmann & Kristensen, 2015, p. 12). In this perspective, the governance of complexity relies on 
processes of deliberation rather than on an invocation of neoliberal subjectivity due to a retreat of 
the state (for the latter view, see Joseph, 2013, p. 40). 
 
Finally, a third strand of research argues that resilience offers a convenient way for states to bring 
security back in. According to Coaffee and Wood (2006, p. 514), particularly in the UK, in clear 
contrast to Cold War emergency planning, ‘a new protective and regulatory state has emerged and is 
articulated through the rhetoric of resilience’; this has lead ‘to the dispersion of security 
responsibilities to all levels of government’. Instead of a retreat of the state, as the ‘resilience as 
neoliberalism’ critics would argue, this would lead to a much stronger role of the state’s attempt of 
providing security. Particularly by invoking the logic of surveillance, Coaffee and Fussey (2015, pp. 91-
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92) assert that the logic of the UK governmental practice after the 2005 terror attacks in London was 
to simply recast the language of security with that of resilience without changing its focus or purpose 
(cf. Raab, Jones & Szekely, 2015). This is even interpreted as an attempt to strengthen the 
responsibility to enact sovereign security: Fjäder (2014, p. 125) sees resilience within current 
attempts by states ‘“fighting back” to maintain control over national security’. 
 
While we read the first strand – resilience as a totalitarian vision of apolitical governmentality – as an 
empirically detached over-interpretation, we see strong linkages between the second and the third 
strand of the scholarly accounts presented here. While of course impossible to impose, resilience is 
still ‘done’ by state agencies; hence it will necessarily influence its role and agency position. In 
discussing the long-term responses to 9/11 from a political perspective, Neal (2012, p. 108) observes 
the results from the classic, exception-based sovereign security trope – security emergencies that 
sideline rights and liberties, and critical deliberation – fading, and ‘more diverse forms of politics 
return’. At a general level, the same process can be seen to be at work with resilience, as it takes the 
room left open by sovereign security. Through the connection with resilience, a transformation of 
sovereign security is initiated, although it remains doubtful if this happens in the form of a simple 
exchange with post-liberal, and therefore post-sovereign forms of a ‘societal security’ (Chandler, 
2013, p. 210). Despite their complementary character, security and resilience certainly fit together 
uneasily as explored below. 
 
Transformations of Sovereign Security: the Development of Resilience in UK National 
Security 
 
As it has already become clear from the variety of research on the subject, resilience is a far-reaching 
concept with a remarkable capacity to provide a bridge between various areas of internal and 
external policies. This insight is underlined when looking at the foundations of UK National Security 
policy. However, from the outset, certain questions remain: does resilience signify a roll-back of the 
state as the main security provider? Or perhaps, is there a transition of responsibilities, in terms of 
other actors or agencies taking on roles which were formerly those of sovereign state security? The 
second question in particular concerns the relationship between the concepts of security and 
resilience.  
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The following section will discuss these issues founded on a critical reading of the main strategy 
papers of contemporary UK national security policy. This focus on the ‘bigger picture’ of strategic 
developments enables us to develop a more concise view on state-based resilience policies, as many 
of the, often contradictory, concepts developed at the local level are results of spatially limited 
initiatives with highly divergent interests, or outcomes of particular regional political settlements. 
The UK government, in contrast, very clearly defines community resilience as a state-led affair (Corry, 
2014, p. 63). 
 
The analysis will highlight three main aspects of the role and function of resilience frameworks in the 
changing landscape of state security, arguing that: first, resilience is not the opposite of security (cf. 
also Bourbeau & Vuori, 2015), but develops almost hand-in-hand after the end of the Cold War as an 
integral part of a resilience-security-nexus addressing the issue of the politics and policies of 
emergency; second, this nexus is built on the inherent failure of sovereign security to provide an 
answer to these challenges; and third, resilience is not only based on a new understanding of what 
these emergencies are and how they are constituted, but also plays a substantial role in the internal 
restructuring of emergency policies at an organisational level. 
 
The first references to resilience in UK security policy at the national level came with the first-ever 
National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008, called ‘Security in an interdependent world’ (Cabinet Office, 
2008). The emergence and the title of this strategy already point to the shift that it represents. 
Before 2008, the UK had mainly papers and strategies in place that dealt with defence. This is also 
true for the last national guidance document before the 2008 strategy, a two-part document from 
2003 called ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’. Whereas the title suggests that it would deal 
with changing aspects of security in its broader sense, it was still published as a ‘defence white 
paper’, with particularly the second part (‘Future Capabilities’ from 2004) focusing almost exclusively 
on military aspects. The emergence of resilience in UK security policy is hence intrinsically tied to the 
evolvement of a ‘security policy’ as such, and its emergence out of the narrow realm of defence. This 
is underlined by the interesting fact that the 2004 Contingency Act, which later became one of the 
central frames of reference for resilience-based policies, does not use the term ‘resilience’ at all.  
The current UK Civil Contingencies doctrine is based on its former iterations, but still introduced 
some considerable and at times unexpected changes. Earlier legislation, based on the Cold War 
mind-sets of 1945 and 1986, put strong emphasis on the responsibility of local authorities in civil 
emergencies, although already then a guiding principle for the state was that ‘the centre has 
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traditionally viewed its role as being that of adviser and coordinator, with local services left to fill in 
the details of operational plans and manage them on the ground’ (Smith, 2003, p. 411). With the new 
civil contingency policy, the state took over more responsibility in such cases. One of the most severe 
changes was that ‘the emphasis on empowering local authorities in emergency planning would be 
replaced by a statutory requirement for this to be undertaken by partnership bodies … liaising closely 
with central departments and Civil Contingencies Secretariat’ (ibid, p. 415). The advent of resilience 
in security policy goes hand in hand with a stronger involvement of the state, and therefore with a 
reinforcement rather than a diminishing of sovereign security. 
 
Resilience has already been an integral part of the tectonic shift in security policy after the end of the 
Cold War. Despite, or even because of, the shocking character of the end of the comfortable 
geostrategic constellation in the years prior to 1990, however, it took years before the consequences 
of the new geostrategic outfit took hold on the policy level. The debate on broadening and 
deepening security in the aftermath of these global events intensified almost ten years later, around 
the year 2000 (cf. Buzan & Hansen, 2010, pp. 187-191). The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent, 
almost all-encompassing focus on the ‘war on terror’, delayed the inevitable process of a 
diversification of what had been defence and now was moulded into security. ‘Twenty years after the 
Berlin Wall came down, the equipment we have available is still too rooted in a Cold War mind-set, 
as we have found to our cost in Iraq and Afghanistan’, the foreword of the 2010 NSS consequently 
states (HM Government, 2010, p. 5). 
 
Interestingly, seen in hindsight, this shift was something almost unanimously agreed upon across the 
whole political spectrum. Especially in the UK system, which tends to have a comparatively strong 
polarisation due to the majority vote system, such non-partisanship is remarkable. While the 2008 
NSS was issued by a Labour government, the subsequent Conservative-Liberal coalition immediately 
took over the torch and issued a 2010 edition; this process is currently continued by the Conservative 
government elected in 2015. 
 
The second part of the heading of the 2008 NSS – ‘interdependent world’ – points to the second 
determining aspect that resilience entails. What is called interdependency here is in fact a world 
perceived as being incalculable; interdependency hence is the neat and positive expression of the 
‘age of uncertainty’ (NSS, 2010, p. 5) that contrasts with the ‘brutal certainties of the Cold War’ (ibid, 
p. 3). Security and resilience immediately link with unpredictability – the certainty of threats gives 
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way to ‘risks’. It is, in particular, this intrinsic linkage of security and resilience with unpredictability 
which supports Chandler’s (2014a) claim that ‘complexity’ is not just an epistemological shift, but 
instead creates a whole new ontology. As it is stated by the national security policy community in the 
UK: ‘The opposition between two power blocs has been replaced by a more complex and 
unpredictable set of relationships’ (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 3). 
 
The condition of uncertainty undisputedly changes the role that sovereign security, and the 
traditional predominance of the state, plays – the question, however, remains which direction this 
change would take and how it should be interpreted. As shown, a popular presumption in current 
research holds that the ontology of risk in security policy leads to a roll-back of the state in the sense 
of a Foucauldian ‘governing from the distance’, fitting well in to current debates on neoliberalism 
(e.g. Joseph, 2014). Indeed, there are clear statements that could be read in support of this 
assumption – security and resilience, both part of the risk governance that results from the notion of 
an ‘interdependent world’, come with a passive self-definition of the state’s role: ‘Some risk is 
inevitable, and the Government’s role is to minimise and mitigate it’ (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 6). 
However, as further analysed below, when discussing the practices of UK policies, the role of 
minimising and mitigating is not to be understood as a roll-back, but rather as the self-reflexive 
(Chandler, 2014b, p. 63) component of a process that may be interpreted, depending on the 
respective political perspective, either as surveillance-oriented micro-management or as security 
policy deliberation. 
 
Hence it is almost inevitable that resilience, as the part of risk governance dealing with the unknown, 
is particularly called upon when dealing with civil emergencies. All NSS link resilience to the 
challenges and processes outlined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, where three particular 
instances are listed that indeed go beyond the focus of security policy: serious damage to human 
welfare; serious damage to the environment of a place; and, finally, serious damage to security, as in 
war or acts of terrorism. The last instance is particularly interesting as it contextualises resilience as 
the mode of action during instances where security has already failed – explicitly – and has led to 
consequences nobody is able to envision. As stated in the wording of the NSS 2010: ‘But we cannot 
prevent every risk as they are inherently unpredictable. To ensure we are able to recover quickly 
when risks turn into actual damage to our interests, we have to promote resilience, both locally and 
nationally’ (HM Government, 2010, p. 25). Sovereign security here remains tied to the exception, but 
instead of the exception being the new normal, it is rather the failure of exceptional policies which 
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reintroduces the non-exceptional via the pragmatic practices (cf. Schmidt, 2015) of resilience. 
Resilience hence aims not for normalising the exception, but for keeping the exception at bay. In 
doing so, it is serving the national (‘our’) interest, which is establishing the paradoxical process of 
sustaining sovereign security while at the same time blurring its boundaries.  
 
The third transformative aspect of resilience sounds rather ordinary, but is nevertheless intrinsically 
linked to the other two features: resilience is used to bridge different policy areas in a way that 
security would not be able to provide. The ‘whole-of-government’ approach, an often-cited policy 
mantra, is one important aim in this respect. Such an approach shall be ‘based on a concept of 
security that goes beyond military effects. It places greater emphasis on domestic resilience and a 
stable global environment’ (HM Government, 2010, p. 10). Especially in a country like the UK, with a 
highly complex and diverse administrative structure, a ‘whole-of-government’ approach means and 
demands a lot, but at the same time is just not sufficient. Therefore the security strategies focus on 
actively engaging the private sector, infrastructure providers in particular, in a set of permanent 
policies of emergency, for which resilience serves as the main background vision.  
 
The much more fluid conception of responsibility linked to the resilience-security-nexus enables the 
active participation of private sector actors in emergency situations to a new extent. It is of course 
important to have a clear and mobilising policy concept in place that attracts people, as resilience 
obviously does. However, there is another important element involved. The idea of sovereign 
security can only provide one way of non-state actor participation in security affairs: based on formal 
obligations, legal accountabilities, formal schemes of security clearances and the like. While this is 
certainly the mode of operation for the old-school defence community, it is hardly a motivating 
context to foster collaboration with the private sector. The discursive arsenal of resilience links up 
with the relief from legal responsibilities, an important factor for actors used to thinking in terms of 
financial liability. It is therefore certainly not by chance that the ‘Local Resilience Forums’ (cf. Cabinet 
Office, 2013a), a key instrument in the application of the concept in UK emergency response, are not 
formally constituted as legal entities; and that this is explicitly forbade in the respective policy 
guidelines. 
 
These three aspects, the main elements of how resilience is constructed and used in UK national 
security policy, suggest that resilience has been an integral part of the tectonic shift in security policy 
after the end of the Cold War. This was not made explicit for several years while the debate focused 
 
The Concept of Resilience between State Security and Sovereign Security:    AP 89       
A Look at Policy Challenges and Interests of the UK 
Jan Pospisil / Barbara Gruber   
 
13 
 
upon the broadening security; however the attempt to evolve broader concepts met with little 
success. This was perhaps inevitable as:  
 
The many insecurities are not equivalent, do not co-exist in one site, and do not 
 systematically reinforce one another… Constructing a theory that synthesises  them around 
a global threat, a grand cultural or civilizational change, or a hegemonic  order will give the 
impression of a homogeneity that does not really exist.  (Huysmans, 2014, p. 1) 
 
In UK security policy, resilience has taken up the role of redefining and cohering a new security 
paradigm after the failure to successfully articulate the idea of ‘unbound security’ (ibid). This 
repackaging was done through focusing on the reconceptualisation of civil emergencies. Thus, 
resilience paradoxically again opens up the floodgates for all-encompassing ideas of life policies, but 
in a different way than security could have done. These differences can be broken down to three 
elements: (1) resilience is dealing with emergencies instead of threats, whereby these emergencies 
are not tackled by the exception-based apparatus of sovereign security, but rather work pre-
emptively and pragmatically to prevent exception; (2) resilience works with the ‘unknown unknowns’ 
of risk, and hence its ‘governance thereby works “backwards” – from the problem – not forwards to 
achieve some collective policy-goal’ (Chandler, 2014b, p. 62); and, therefore, (3) resilience does not 
replace, but complements sovereign security by adding a post-liberal, reflexive element. Thereby, a 
complex is emerging which breaks the limits of sovereign policies with the paradoxical aim of 
reinforcing them: the resilience-security-nexus. 
 
Soft but Sustainable Transformation: How Resilience Policy Unfolds 
 
After discussing the resilience-security-nexus on the macro level of national security strategies, the 
following section focuses on the application of concrete guidances and directives, and analyses the 
mode of governance that is applied through UK resilience policy at the local level. Such a focus on the 
local, particularly on the community level, is a well-discussed topic in resilience research and often 
connected to the question of state responsibility (cf. Bourcart, 2015). Compared to most of the 
scholarly accounts, however, UK national doctrine suggests a different picture. In following up this 
gap between the scholarly discussion and the impression generated by national policy strategies, this 
section will ask in which particular sectors resilience policies unfold, what aims are put in place for 
these policies, and how these policies are used at a concrete, ‘on-the-ground’ level. 
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As shown above, resilience is not an overarching goal that subsumes all other forms of policy that 
addresses civil emergencies, but links up with security to form a resilience-security-nexus. This nexus 
works with the particular figure of risk, which, despite dealing per definition with unprecise, 
undefined or even unknown dangers, is subject to scientific efforts of risk quantification and 
‘registering’ (Hagmann & Dunn Cavelty, 2012). In the UK, there is a national risk assessment process 
in place, which undertakes to identify and estimate the main risks in relation to civil emergencies in a 
yearly rhythm. The current edition of this risk assessment (Cabinet Office, 2015) identifies major risks 
that exceed the limits of what has been conceptualised under broad security frameworks and are 
thus exemplars of resilience, including widespread electricity failure, coastal flooding, and pandemic 
influenza. 
 
Therefore, organising resilience has to follow the policy areas in which these risks are potentially 
emerging. Table 1 (see below), taken from the publicly available short version of the confidential UK 
sector resilience plans, lists these eleven areas along with the respective governmental responsibility. 
This planning process offers two important insights. Firstly, the resilience part of the resilience-
security-nexus evolves around the ‘soft’ issues, and thus could be defined as encompassing 
everything outside the realm of ‘hard’ security (which would require the use of weaponry in 
whatever form). The UK version of the resilience-security nexus thereby takes the form of 
straightforward complementary task sharing, with security focused on prevention and combating, 
and resilience on all other aspects. 
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Table 1: Target areas for UK resilience policies (Cabinet Office, 2014, p. 5) 
 
Sector Sub-Sector(s) Sector Resilience Lead 
Communications Broadcast Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
Postal Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
Telecommunications Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
Emergency 
Services 
Ambulance Department of Health 
Maritime & Coastguard Department for Transport 
Fire & Rescue Dpt for Communities and Local Government 
Police Home Office 
Energy Electricity Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Gas Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Oil Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Finance  HM Treasury 
Food  Dpt for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Government  Department of Health 
Hazardous Sites  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
Health  Department of Health 
Nuclear  Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Transport Aviation Department for Transport 
Ports Department for Transport 
Rail Department for Transport 
Road Department for Transport 
Water  Dpt for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
 
As can be seen, each sector has a clear responsibility chain with a named lead ministry attached to it, 
which has two implications: firstly, that resilience in its applied version on the policy level is a 
strongly state administered affair. This leads to a second consequence regarding the mode of 
governance: notwithstanding the counterintuitivity of such a practice, resilience is applied as a 
surprisingly strictly top-down project, inherently linked with local practices, as will be shown further 
below, and so can be seen to be a highly bureaucratised endeavour of state agencies. UK resilience is 
less concerned with the enabling or shaping of resilient identities than with the tight control over 
policy and the public-private mixture of policy actors. 
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Besides the definition of target areas and respective responsibilities, UK resilience policy has also 
developed a particular concept of resilience, primarily addressing the concerns of infrastructure. The 
concept rests on four pillars, namely resistance, reliability, redundancy and response and recovery 
(Cabinet Office, 2014, p. 6). This concept is outlined in the so-called Sector Resilience Plans, the 
central document for planning and designing resilience at the local level. Surprisingly for plans 
addressing concerns of what allegedly should be a bottom-up process, these documents are 
classified and only publicly available in a summarised version (cf. Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 38).  
 
The four pillars of infrastructure resilience are significant in two aspects. Firstly, they demonstrate 
the importance that the idea of infrastructure has gained in the context of civil emergency policies. 
All of these pillars, in particular resistance, reliability and redundancy, are designed as mainly 
technical measures. They are not targeting subjects or even subjectivity, but are concerned with 
issues of hardware, its durability, functionality and disposability. As the plans elaborate, resistance is 
defined as the physical protection of infrastructure components, reliability means maintaining 
operability, and redundancy means physical back-up capacities (ibid). The human factor, which 
should play an important part in a concept dealing with the idea of complex social systems (cf. 
Joseph, 2013, p. 43 on the advanced conceptual development of resilience in the ecology literature), 
is confined to the fourth pillar, which deals with the traditional measures of emergency relief. 
 
This compartmentalisation highlights the areas where resilience is placed within the resilience-
security-nexus. Resilience engages in pre-emption, but has no particular strong role in the realm of 
prevention, which remains the stronghold of security. The pre-emptive efforts, however, try to think 
about all possible needs in dealing with the ‘unknown unknowns’ of a complex risk environment. As 
shown, however, this is done with the sole focus on what is perceived as ‘critical’ infrastructure, with 
the idea of ‘keeping the country running’ (Cabinet Office, 2011) and maintaining functional 
capacities.  
 
The key idea in this context is the element of redundancy. While a common concept in informatics 
and systems of complex communication, redundancy in the context of civil emergency preparedness 
is something which only resilience can provide. The particularity of redundancy is based on two 
distinct contrapositions: redundancy contrasts with the traditional security idea of protection, to the 
extent of contesting its possibility, while at the same time it breaks with the neoliberal idea of cost-
 
The Concept of Resilience between State Security and Sovereign Security:    AP 89       
A Look at Policy Challenges and Interests of the UK 
Jan Pospisil / Barbara Gruber   
 
17 
 
effectiveness – having diverse, partly overlapping systems in place is certainly not the cheapest 
option in the short run.  
 
The relationship of redundancy and security in general is an uneasy one: while its importance is 
generally acknowledged (however, mainly in terms of personnel and hardware), it is seen as 
problematic, particularly from the perspective of linear systems theory (cf. Walker & Cooper, 2011, 
pp. 156-157). Systemic failure, caused by ‘common-mode errors’, ‘social shirking’ or 
overcompensation, could backfire (Sagan, 2004). Since it is dealing with the exceptional, security has 
to design tailored solutions; everything else puts the control at risk. Resilience instead is not working 
in the logic of controlling exceptional responses, but is concerned with guaranteeing the sovereign 
duty of care of the government despite the severe limits of its possibility. Redundancy offers an 
answer to this conceptual and structural challenge; consequently, it is operationalised jointly with 
the private sector, in an attempted top-down engagement of infrastructure providers in what could 
be called a redundancy buy-in. 
 
Deriving from the government-led top-down responsibility chain, the main addressees of UK 
resilience policy are local government agencies, in particular the so-called ‘responders’. These 
addressees are assembled on the local level in the form of the already mentioned ‘Local Resilience 
Forums’, formal, but not legal institutions to be set up on county level to institutionalise a multi-
agency partnership in emergency response. Along with the definition given by the respective policy 
doctrines, the providers are divided into three groups, each with particular tasks that go alongside 
legal implications (HM Government, 2013): ‘Category 1 responders’ are the traditional first 
responders and security providers that have a legal entity tied to the structures. They represent what 
still exists as sovereign security: police, fire and rescue authorities, health bodies, protection 
agencies, environmental agencies and local authorities. As a consequence of their status, all legal 
responsibilities are with them, in particular the formal lead of the Local Resilience Forums. Hence 
they represent the central link in the top-down, state-led chain of civil emergency policies. 
 
These state-governed Category 1 responders are surrounded by what the policy documents call the 
‘wider resilience community’. This is a euphemism, given that this ‘wider’ community in fact points to 
the upper levels of the above-mentioned responsibility chain of the involved state agencies. 
Primarily, addressees are national government agencies such as the National Health Service, the 
military and ministries; hence state institutions that are not only responsible for the set-up of the 
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resilience policy in the first place, but would be technically responsible if a repacked, limited concept 
of sovereign security to civil emergencies was to be applied. 
 
‘Category 2 responders’, in contrast, are the core of applied UK resilience policy at the local level, as 
these responders epitomise the factual justifications for its existence. Category 2 responders 
represent the level of infrastructure providers – namely utilities, telecommunication, transport and 
related areas – that in the UK context are mostly private enterprises. The privatisation of critical 
infrastructure has been considered to be a crucial challenge for security policy (De Bruijne & Van 
Eeten, 2007). Resilience at this level has two very concrete tasks: firstly, the provision of a conceptual 
grounding enabling diverse actors to be on board without having to rely on legal coercive means; 
and, secondly, facilitating engagement in a direct face-to-face network of responsibility helping to 
operationalise the cost-critical aspect of resilience: redundancy.  
 
Resilience, however, enables the government to engage the private providers to invest in these 
redundancies in their own interest. It is with these Category 2 responders that the primarily 
mundane, highly bureaucratic, and top-down endeavour of UK resilience policy unfolds its 
governmental component, as it constructs a deeper reason for private enterprises to invest in almost 
by definition not cost-effective – hence redundant – parts of infrastructure. They shall do this 
voluntarily, as the legal duties remain with the other two types of resilience actors assembled in the 
not legally constructed Local Resilience Forums.  
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Conclusions 
 
The analysis of UK resilience policy has shown that applied resilience is a mundane process, a 
predominantly technical and also highly regulated affair. While deeply embedded in practices of 
public service provision on the local level, the state still retains the control of a sovereign, installing 
the resilience-security-nexus as a top-down-form of governance based on a work-sharing scheme 
along rationalist criteria of response efficiency. The governance issue is addressed in a dense 
manner, with the notion of ‘community’ almost never touching the people living in the community, 
but instead dealing with the established responders, government agencies, and the commercial 
providers. It is hardly governing from a distance that takes place here, but an attempt to closely 
regulate and direct local processes in a way that can be interpreted as a rather extreme case of 
subsidiarity in the realm of emergency. Nevertheless, resilience is still of utmost importance for 
organising an all-encompassing approach to emergency policy, after the attempt of stretching the 
limits of security to all areas of life has failed. Sovereign security, based on the liberal distinction 
between government and the governed, needs the post-liberal element of resilience to maintain 
continuity in the era of complexity. 
 
Resilience takes the role of accompanying exceptional security policies, highlighting their failure 
while at the same time relying on them. The so established resilience-security nexus creates a new 
quality of density in the governance of civil emergencies – governance, however, not in the sense of 
governing from the distance, but applied by the top-down-led establishment of numerous micro-
practices at the local level. Nevertheless, the current strategies and policy papers reveal that the 
resilient subject remains surprisingly hidden in the UK policies. UK resilience policy does not rely on 
strategies of enabling at the levels of communities, households or individuals. The main addressees 
are the existing government structures at the local level on the one hand, and the privately organised 
infrastructure providers on the other. 
 
Local resilience mainly tries to engage the business sector at the level of critical infrastructure; hence 
it is a tool to enhance public care beyond the boundaries of legal responsibilities. They are hooked up 
in a non-legal, but still strongly formalised framework – the Local Resilience Forums – and integrated 
in a highly complex process of risk assessment, planning and preparedness. The latter part especially 
needs the engagement of the private sector, since infrastructure redundancy needs substantial 
financial investments that, more often than not, do not give a return in the short run. The voluntary 
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participation of providers on the local level serves not the community level, but rather the 
government – in sharing costs and responsibilities without the need to set up institutionalised 
elements of legal coercion.  
 
Despite some scholarly accounts claiming this, resilience, at least in its applied version in the UK, 
does not represent a roll-back of state policies in the realm of security. While cost-effectiveness is 
certainly a factor, the main interest behind getting the private sector on board is the widening of a 
control and safety regime along the laid-out principles of response, reliability and redundancy, as the 
latter in particular is almost by definition certainly not the most cost-effective way of doing things in 
the short term. 
 
Nevertheless, the formerly closed practices of security are changing. New agents and partners are 
brought in and engaged, whilst the state transforms its role from the sole security provider to a 
primus inter pares. While starting to rely on non-legal formations in doing so, however, the sovereign 
aspect of the resilience-security-nexus still plays an essential part: the main tool of precise policy 
planning, the Sector Resilience Plans, remain a piece of classified information, not available to the 
public. As such, they represent an almost ideal showcase of the nexus-aspect between the broad, all-
encompassing notion of resilience and the repacked idea of sovereign security; a showcase, however, 
that also demonstrates that the embedded contradiction between the two elements cannot be fully 
resolved. 
 
Resilience is the result of the rejection of full responsibility for security provision by the state, due to 
its impossibility. At the same time, resilience relies on the condition that sovereign security remains 
in place, based on this very promise. This contradiction remains at the heart of the resilience-
security-nexus. It shows the fractured character of the transformation of sovereign security out of 
the old ideas of national defence, a process that we are indeed witnessing. In this process of change, 
however, resilience takes up the role of enabling the repackaging – and hence the re-legitimisation – 
of sovereign security in the condition of its publicly acknowledged failure. 
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